A B S T R A C T
The perceived link between municipal service provision and fee payment is a critical driver of social equity and spatial order in urban neighborhoods. This research, therefore, investigates the behavior and underlying reasons for the payment or non-payment of municipal fees across neighborhoods exhibiting varying levels of socioeconomic privilege within Zanjan city—specifically, Islamabad (representing informal settlements), Farhang Kouy (semi-privileged), and Karmandan (privileged). Employing a descriptive-analytical methodology with a quantitative approach, the study utilizes Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). Data were gathered via questionnaires (n=384) and official municipal statistics (2014-2025). Findings reveal the highest payment rate in Farhang Kouy (85.5%), exceeding Karmandan (81.6%) and Islamabad (67.6%), suggesting the significant influence of non-economic factors on payment behavior. SEM results indicate that while Awareness and Information Dissemination demonstrates excellent reliability (α=0.863), it exerts a significant negative effect on both Payment Behavior (β=-0.386) and Attitude towards Payment (β=-0.452). This paradoxical effect implies that increased awareness, in the absence of transparency, diminishes the propensity to pay. Attitude towards Payment (α=0.923) positively influences Trust and Social Participation (β=0.758), yet its direct impact on Payment Behavior is weak and negative (β=-0.204). Similarly, Trust and Social Participation (α=0.921) show a limited negative effect on Payment Behavior (β=-0.204), highlighting a pronounced attitude-behavior gap among citizens. These findings emphasize that perceptual and attitudinal variables dominate behavioral outcomes. Consequently, municipal policy must prioritize operational transparency, service quality improvements, and genuine citizen participation to align perceptions with compliant behavior and foster equitable urban governance.

Extended Abstract
Introduction
The expectation of municipal public services in return for the payment of urban development fees is a central issue in shaping social justice and spatial order in urban neighborhoods. Consequently, from the perspective of urban management, there is a direct correlation between the payment of such fees and the provision of services to the neighborhoods. Therefore, this study aims to examine the behavior and motivations underlying residents’ decisions to pay or not pay municipal fees in neighborhoods with different levels of socio-economic advantage in Zanjan (Islamabad, an informal settlement; Farhang, semi-advantaged; and Employees, affluent). In neighborhoods such as Farhang, with relatively lower levels of affluence, residents typically face limited access to public services, while affluent areas such as Employees show greater satisfaction with the municipality's performance. Therefore, analyzing payment behavior across these contrasting neighborhoods can shed light on the relationships among spatial inequality, citizen satisfaction, and financial participation. This research is important not only for urban policymakers seeking to reform service frameworks and resource allocation, but also for increasing civic engagement, public trust, and the efficiency of municipal financial systems.
The present study aims to analyze differences in urban affluence, toll payment patterns, and the factors that affect them, and to examine three selected neighborhoods in Zanjan city that represent a range of socio-economic and physical urban conditions. These neighborhoods include Islamabad (informal settlement) in the west of the city with an area of ​​120.5 hectares and a population of 23,465 people; Farhang (semi-affluent) in the west of the city with an area of ​​210 hectares and a population of 19,176 people; and the Karmandan neighborhood (affluent) in the north of the city with an area of ​​126.5 hectares and a population of 12,617 people. The population density calculation shows that Islamabad is the most densely populated neighborhood with a density of 194.8, indicating population pressure on limited infrastructure in informal areas, while Farhang Neighborhood with a density of 91.3, and Karmandan Neighborhood, with a density of 99.7, show moderate densities consistent with more open textures and a relative balance of area and population in semi-privileged and affluent areas.
 
Methodology
This study uses a descriptive-analytical research design with a quantitative approach and uses structural equation modeling (SEM) to analyze the data. Data were collected through two main sources as a researcher-made questionnaire (sample size: 384 respondents) and official municipal statistics (2014-2023). This study, using a causal-structural approach, addresses questions about why, how, and the factors affecting residents' payment behaviors in neighborhoods with different socioeconomic statuses. It was evaluated using Cronbach's alpha coefficient and composite reliability (CR = 0.81), both of which exceeded acceptable thresholds for academic research. To examine the actual status of municipal fee payment by residents of three neighborhoods with different levels of wealth, statistics on issued, paid, and unpaid receipts were analyzed during the period 2014-2023. This data provides an objective picture of citizens' financial performance towards their citizenship responsibilities in the form of fees.
 
Results and discussion
In the Karmandan Neighborhood, known for its complete and formalized infrastructure, the highest number of issued receipts (25,860) was recorded, of which about 81.5 percent (21,089) were paid. This ratio indicates a high level of adherence to municipal financial obligations, institutional trust in the municipality, and likely tangible receipt of municipal services in exchange for payments. Also, the number of uncollected receipts in this neighborhood was relatively low compared to the total amount of receivables, indicating a high receipt collection rate. In the Farhang neighborhood, which is classified as a semi-privileged area, of a total of about 19,116 receipts issued, only 8,177 have been paid, equivalent to 42.8 percent. This ratio is lower than the citywide average and reflects economic considerations, low citizen satisfaction, or insufficient incentives and motivations to pay. On the other hand, the total number of uncollected receipts in this neighborhood is significant, indicating that despite the issuance of receipts, a large percentage of the claims have not been realized.
In Islamabad, an informal, underserved neighborhood, the financial situation is much worse. Of the total 23,721 receipts issued, only 8,044 and 7,992 receipts were paid; that is, about 34 percent of the total receipts were actually collected. This ratio indicates the lowest payment rate among the three neighborhoods. Also, the high rate of uncollected receipts and the high level of debt in this neighborhood indicate a trust gap, an ineffective information system, and possibly social resistance to formal institutions. In terms of payment rate and financial performance, Farhang Neighborhood is clearly the most successful in collecting debts, with an 85.5 percent payment rate, indicating a high level of financial commitment and the effectiveness of the municipality’s follow-up systems in this semi-underserved area.
In contrast, Islamabad recorded the lowest performance, with a payment rate of 6.67 percent, which reveals structural challenges such as poverty, limited access to payment services, and distrust among low-income residents. Karmandan, despite its high affluence, also recorded a payment rate of 6.81 percent, which, although acceptable, would have been expected given the apparent financial strength of the residents. In terms of outstanding debt and challenges, the Karmandan Neighborhood has created the municipality's largest financial crisis, with 144 billion tomans in outstanding debt. This figure, despite the high level of affluence, indicates weakness in managing large bills or in dealing with non-payment in this neighborhood. Islamabad, with 6.64 billion tomans in debt, experiences a predictable challenge that is directly related to poverty and the inability of low-income residents to pay.
On the other hand, Farhang Neighborhood has the lowest debt volume, at 32 billion Tomans, confirming the success of the collection system in this semi-privileged area. The difference between neighborhoods shows that the level of well-being is not a predictor of the payment rate; the Farhang Neighborhood (semi-privileged) has performed better with the payment rate than the employees (privileged), while Islamabad (underprivileged) requires supportive approaches. Also, employees, despite their financial strength, have the largest outstanding debt, indicating management challenges, while Farhang Neighborhood has recorded the lowest debt. These contrasts underscore the need for policymaking tailored to each neighborhood's characteristics in Zanjan Municipality. The level of well-being is not the only factor determining payment; attitudes, social trust, awareness of how to spend money, and the quality of services provided by the municipality also play a decisive role. In neighborhoods such as Islamabad, where participation and trust indicators are lower, collection rates have also decreased. In contrast, in a neighborhood such as Farhang, which is moderately well-off, participation rates have been higher. This result is well consistent with the structural equation model, which shows a significant relationship among attitude, social trust, and payment behavior. The results indicate a strong correlation between municipal fee payment patterns and neighborhood well-being/legitimacy. In more affluent areas, residents demonstrate trust, financial discipline, and a clearer motivation to comply with the rules. Conversely, in informal settlements, issues such as distrust, perceived discrimination, and the lack of tangible services or formal property rights weaken incentives and reduce participation. It is noteworthy that the payment rate in Farhang (85.5%) is higher than those in Karmandan (81.6%) and Islamabad (67.6%), highlighting the role of non-economic factors in payment behavior.
Structural equation modeling (SEM) results show that awareness campaigns, despite excellent reliability (α = 0.863), show a significant negative effect on payment behavior (β = -0.386) and attitude towards payment (β = -0.452). This paradoxical result shows that increased information can reduce compliance, particularly when cost allocation is perceived as ambiguous. Payment attitudes; Positive attitudes towards payment show a strong positive effect on trust and social participation (β = 0.758), but their direct effect on behavior is weak and negative (β = -0.204). Trust and participation; Trust/social participation similarly shows a limited negative effect on payment behavior (β = -0.204), confirming the persistent attitude-behavior gap among citizens. The findings indicate that cognitive and attitudinal variables mainly have a negative effect on payment behavior. As a result, municipal policymaking should prioritize increasing operational transparency, improving the quality of municipal services, and fostering genuine citizen participation to reduce the attitude-behavior gap and increase the willingness to comply with costs within the framework of spatial justice and citizen satisfaction. At the macro level, this study emphasizes that urban finance models need to shift from a “behavior change” approach to a “structural change” model. Municipalities cannot simply rely on raising awareness or imposing fines. Instead, they need to reform resource distribution systems and ensure spatial justice to foster trust and engagement.
 
Conclusion
Ultimately, this research not only deepens the understanding of the cost-sharing phenomenon but also serves as a practical guide for cities in Iran and other developing countries. Sustainable cities emerge from the synergy of “transparency, accountability, and equity,” without these three pillars, no city finance system can function sustainably.
 
Funding
There is no funding support.
 
Authors’ Contribution
Authors contributed equally to the conceptualization and writing of the article. All of the authors approved thecontent of the manuscript and agreed on all aspects of the work declaration of competing interest none.
 
Conflict of Interest
Authors declared no conflict of interest.
 
Acknowledgments
 We are grateful to all the scientific consultants of this paper